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We investigate the proposition that the health of migrants does not constitute a random sample of the health 
of the sending region using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics on internal migration within the 
United States. Panel data is crucial, as it enables us to observe geographic mobility as well as the health of 
the migrant prior to migration. We find that, for men and women below 60 years of age, a move from the 
middle to the bottom of the health distribution reduces mobility by 32-40% and 12-18%, respectively. Non-
random attrition from the panel implies that these estimates are lower bounds. By contrast, we find 
evidence that, among older people, there is higher mobility at the top and bottom of the health distribution 
than there is at the middle. We consider two explanations for this: first that elderly persons may migrate to 
be closer to a family network once they fall ill, and second that non-random attrition may also be causing 
an upwards bias in the estimated effect of illness on mobility.  
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1 Introduction
Social scientists have long recognized that health can impact both the costs and net beneﬁts of
migration. Poor health may increase the costs of executing all the activities that are necessary
to migrate. In addition, poor health often necessitates an infrastructure to maintain and to
facilitate activity, doctors to monitor their illnesses, medications and insurance to pay for it
all. On the other hand, however, there are plausible scenarios in which illness may impact,
either positively or negatively, the net beneﬁts of migration. For example, sick people may have
a greater incentive to migrate to locations where there is a stronger familial support network
or better health care.1 Overall, there are good reasons to expect health to impact a person’s
probability of migration (although the sign and magnitude of this eﬀect is not ap r i o r iobvious)
and that the health of a migrant will not be a random draw from the distribution of health in
the sending region.
Many studies have investigated the idea that migrants do not constitute a random sample of
the population from which they were drawn. The majority of these studies have concentrated on
1It has been suggested that this is one of the primary motives of return migration of Latinos from the US
(Scribner 1994 and 1996).
2labor market outcomes. In one of the earliest studies on the topic, Chiswick (1978) observed that
in the period immediately after arrival, immigrants in the US tended to earn less than natives;
however, after spending ten to ﬁfteen years in the US, migrant earnings overtook native earnings.
The explanation that was given for this phenomenon was that migrants are positively selected
from their home countries and, hence, tend to be more motivated and ambitious than their
native-born counterparts.2 In a similar piece, Gabriel and Schmitz (1994) tested for positive
selection in internal migration within the US. They showed that, prior to moving, migrants
earned higher wages than demographically comparable non-migrants. More recently, Chiquiar
and Hanson (2005), using Mexican and US Census data, calculated counter-factual wage densities
and showed that Mexican immigrants in the US would have occupied the middle to upper parts
of the Mexican wage distribution had they remained in Mexico. All of these studies support the
claim that migrants are positively selected, at least when it comes to labor market outcomes.
There is also a substantial and related literature in demography and epidemiology that in-
vestigates the relationship between health and migration. Much of this literature focuses on
international migration and documents a correlation in which migrants tend to be in better
health than non-migrants. Interestingly, this literature has failed to produce a consensus about
the underlying causal mechanisms which are responsible for this correlation.
Several explanations have been proposed. Pablos-Mendéz (1994) and Scribner (1994 and
2However, Chiswick’s assertion that migrants are a positively selected group has been contested - most notably
by Borjas (1987) who points out that Chiswick’s estimates may be biased by omitted cohort eﬀects. Borjas
contends that these omitted cohort eﬀects may matter if there has been a progressive deterioration in migrant
quality with successive migrant cohorts. Using US census data, he argues that migrants from Western Europe have
assimilated quite well and have progressively exhibited an increase in earnings over time. In contrast, he argues
that migrants from poorer areas of the world, notably Latin America, have shown the opposite patterns; their rates
of assimilation are quite poor and their earnings have steadily declined with successive cohorts. However, Borjas
provides no evidence that migrants in the US would have resided in the lower tail of the earnings distribution of
their home had they not migrated. Finally, it is important to mention that Borjas’ ﬁndings have been scrutinized
by Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990).
31996) speculated that the observed lower mortality rates among Latinos in the United States,
or the “Latino Paradox,” is a consequence of Latino migrants returning to their home countries
to die once they fall ill - the so-called “Salmon Bias.” Such return migration would mean that
many Latino deaths would never get recorded in the US death records, thereby rendering many
immigrants “statistically immortal.” (Pablos-Mendéz 1994) However, the evidence on the validity
of this hypothesis is mixed.3 Others have argued that more favorable cultural and behavioral
factors are responsible for better health outcomes among migrants.4 A third explanation posits
that, just as migrants are positively selected on their ability to perform in the labor market, they
are also positively selected on their health status.
There is some evidence of positive health selectivity in the demography and epidemiology
literatures. For example, Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig and Smith (2004) (hereafter JMRS) use
the National Health Interview Survey and show that international migrants in the United States
have a lower prevalence of many chronic conditions upon arrival.5 In another study, Marmot,
Adelstein and Bulusu (1984) compared mortality rates of migrants in the United Kingdom to the
corresponding mortality rates of non-migrants in the sending countries and showed a strong ten-
dency for mortality rates to be substantially lower among migrants than non-migrants. Swallen
(2002) has found similar ﬁndings in the United States.
3Palloni and Arias (2004) provide evidence that the Salmon Bias is important in explaning the Latino Paradox.
However, Abriado-Lanza, et al. (1999) provide evidence that mortality diﬀerentials exist for Puerto Ricans, whose
deaths do get recorded in the National Death Index, and Cuban migrants, who primarily for political reasons do
not return home, and thus provide evidence against the hypothesis.
4For example, Marmot and Syme (1976) have speculated that the lower rates of coronary heart disease among
Japanese migrants to California are the consequence of a lower level of psycho-social stress which results from the
way that Japanese society is structured. Others such as Markides and Coreil (1986) have speculated the lower
mortality rates among Latinos are the consequence of diﬀering health related behaviors.
5Two points are worth noting. First, this may reﬂect a lower diagnosis of certain chronic conditions among
immigrants, many of whom came from countries with less developed health care systems. Second, this result
compares the health on migrants and non-migrants in the receiving region, not the sending region.
4However, despite this suggestive evidence of positive health selectivity, there is a surprising
dearth of papers in the literature that have provided a rigorous investigation into the issue.
As pointed out by JMRS, a proper test of health selection involves a comparison of the health
of migrants and non-migrants in the sending region, not the receiving region since there are a
number of factors that could diﬀer across regions which inﬂuence mortality. We believe that one
of the primary reasons for the lack of proper tests of health selectivity is inadequate data from
sending countries prior to the occurrence of any migration.
In this paper, we attempt to ﬁll this void in the literature by quantifying both the sign and
the magnitude of the impact of health on migration using data on internal migration within
the United States from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). One of the advantages
of focusing on internal US migration is that it enables us to observe the migrant’s health prior
to migration and, thus, provides us with a direct test of selection. One disadvantage of our
approach, however, is that it is not clear how much we can extrapolate our results to the case of
international migration. Nevertheless, as suggested by JMRS if illness increases intranational
migration costs, it is also reasonable to expect similar (if not greater) eﬀects when considering
international migration.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline our theoretical
framework. In section 3, we describe the data. In section 4, we discuss our empirical method-
ology. In section 5, we discuss our empirical ﬁndings. In section 6, we discuss some sources of
bias in our estimates including systematic biases in self-reported health status and non-random
attrition from the panel. Section 7 concludes.
52 Theoretical Considerations
We model the migration decision using the standard model of migration as discussed in Borjas





where h is an index that is increasing in the quality of the individual’s health. The values µ and
ε represent the systematic and idiosyncratic components of utility. There are costs to migration
w h i c ha r eg i v e nb yC(h). We assume that C0(h) < 0 so that the costs of migration are lower
for healthier people. These migration costs may be pecuniary costs such as the actual costs of
relocation, but they may also capture the “psychic costs” of migration, as well.
Following Borjas, the migration decision is determined by the sign of the index function
I =( µ1(h) − µ0(h) − C(h)) + (ε1 − ε0). (3)
If I>0 (I<0), then the person migrates (does not migrate). Letting F(.) denote the
Cumulative Density Function of υ ≡ ε1−ε0, we obtain that the migration propensity is given by
P ≡ 1 − F (z) (4)
where z ≡− (µ1(h) − µ0(h) − C(h)).









where f(.) is the Probability Density Function of υ.T h e ﬁrst term in brackets, C0(h),i st h e
impact of health on the costs of migration and the second term, µ0
1(h) − µ0
0(h), is the impact of
health on the net beneﬁts of migration. If the second term is zero, then we will unambiguously
have that ∂P
∂h > 0 so that good health lowers migration costs and, thus, increases mobility.6
Understanding the second term is slightly more complicated. While one can tell a variety of
stories, we believe that if the term is non-zero, it is most likely negative so that good health
would decrease the beneﬁts of migration. For example, sick people with insuﬃcient support
networks at home may have to relocate to areas with better health care or stronger familial
support networks. In such a scenario, the second term would operate in the opposite direction
as the ﬁrst and, thus, the net eﬀects of health on mobility would be ambiguous. We conclude
that, on purely theoretical grounds, there are no ap r i o r ireasons to expect the sign of ∂P
∂h to be
either positive or negative. Accordingly, we turn to the data.
3T h e D a t a
We use data from the PSID spanning the years 1984 to 1993 on geographic mobility, health
status and other control variables which include age, income, gender, education, race and marital
6Note that the assumption that the second term is zero does not imply that health has no eﬀect on the
systematic component of utility which one would expect if good health raised wages by making it easier to work,
but it does require that the systematic returns to good health be “balanced” in the sense that µ0
1(h)=µ0
0(h).
7status.7 The PSID only has data on health status for heads of household and their spouses (if the
household head is married). Consequently, throughout this analysis, we restrict our attention to
these people. Our migration measure, “Moved,” is an indicator of whether or not the individual
changed states across survey years which is turned on if the individual lived in a diﬀerent state
in the previous time period. This deﬁnition of migration is common in the literature on internal
migration within the US (e.g. Borjas, Bronnars and Trejo 1992; Gabriel and Schmitz 1994). We
use Self-Reported Health Status (SRHS) as our measure of health. SRHS is a categorical variable
that takes on integer values between one and ﬁve with one the most healthy category and ﬁve
the least healthy. While these measures are subjective, there is an extensive literature that has
shown a strong link between SRHS and health outcomes such as mortality and the prevalence of
disease (Mossey and Shapiro 1982; Kaplan and Camacho 1983; Idler and Kasl 1995; Smith 2003).
We break the SRHS variable into two binary indicator variables: Healthy, which is turned on
when SRHS is either one or two, and Unhealthy, which is turned on when SRHS is either four
or ﬁve. All other variable deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics for this sample can be found in
Table 1. Finally, the PSID contains an over-sample of economically disadvantaged people called
the Survey of Economic Opportunities (SEO). In this paper, we include the SEO. We do so
because dropping it would have substantially reduced the number of moves in our data and thus
resulted in more ineﬃcient estimates.8
7We do not use data prior to 1984 because the SRHS question was not asked prior to that year. We not use
data past 1993 because data on location are not publicly available from 1994 onward.
8T h e r ei sl i t t l ec o n s e n s u sw i t h i nt h ep r o f e s s i o na b o u thow one should deal with the SEO. Because it is selected
on income and, thus, endogenous, conventional weighting schemes will not work. Accordingly, some people such
as Lillard and Willis (1977) simply recommend dropping the SEO due to endogenous selection. Nevertheless,
there are others such as Hyslop (1999) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) who include the SEO.
84E m p i r i c a l M e t h o d s
Our empirical analogue to the migration rule in equation (3) is
mi,t =1 ( gi,t−1γ + bi,t−1β + X
0
i,tθ + εi,t ≥ 0) (6)
where mi,t is a migration indicator which we deﬁn e di nt h en e x ts e c t i o n ,gi,t is the variable
“Healthy,” an indicator of excellent or very good health, bi,t i st h ev a r i a b l e“ U n h e a l t h y , ”a n
i n d i c a t o ro fp o o ro rf a i rh e a l t h ,a n dXi,t is a column vector of individual characteristics. Note
that in the above speciﬁcation, the middle SRHS category (i.e. SRHS equal to three) is omit-
ted. Xi,t contains age, gender, education, race, state and marital status dummies as well as a
quadratic function of (lagged) income. The index function inside of equation (6) is meant to
approximate the net beneﬁts of migration as deﬁned in the theoretical model. We assume a
Normal distribution for εi,t and so generate all results using Probit estimation. This gives us an
empirical analogue to equation (4)















0. All standard errors are adjusted for
correlations within individuals.
A crucial part of our identiﬁcation strategy is to include lags of the health status variables.
We do this because a proper test of health selectivity involves a comparison of the health of
movers and stayers prior to the occurrence of any migration as there are a variety of reasons to
expect migration to feed back and impact a person’s health. For example, if it is the case that
9a sick person moves to be closer to a family member who is able to take care of them, then we
might expect the move to improve the person’s health. On the other hand, Kasl and Berkman
(1983) have speculated that the stress of moving may induce a deterioration in health. Both of
these scenarios suggest that it is crucial to have a measure of health status prior to the occurrence
of the move if we are to reliably estimate the impact of health on migration. Fortunately, the
panel structure of our data allows us to do this.
5 Empirical Results
Table 2 displays our estimation results for men and women younger than age 60 estimated
separately by gender. The ﬁrst three columns display the results for men and the last three for
women. In all six columns, we see substantial evidence that migrants are positively selected on
health. The F-tests show that the health variables are always jointly signiﬁcant. For men, being
unhealthy decreases the probability of migration by between 1.2 and 1.5 percentage points. For
women, being unhealthy decreases the probability of migration by between 0.4 and 0.6 percentage
points. Since the average probabilities of migration for men and women under 60 are 3.7% and
3.3%, respectively, these marginal eﬀects constitute rather large eﬀects in percentage terms.
Indeed, moving from good health, which is the omitted SRHS category in these regressions, to
worse health lowers the probability of migration by 32-40% for men and 12-18% for women. In
columns three and six, we add a comprehensive set of controls including a complete set of state
dummies. While the coeﬃcients on the health variables are attenuated somewhat, they still
remain jointly signiﬁcant at levels higher than 95%. The coeﬃcients on the additional control
variables all have the expected signs.
10In Table 4, we estimate the models using a sub-sample of people older than 60. We consider
the same speciﬁcations as we considered in Table 3. As can readily be seen, the eﬀects of
health on migration are substantially diﬀerent for older people than they are for younger people.
For men, we see that being both healthy and unhealthy have positive impacts on migration
probabilities and, thus, health appears to have a non-monotonic eﬀect on mobility. By contrast,
we do not see any evidence that health impacts the mobility of women over 60.
Taken at face value, these results suggest that both of the eﬀects of health on the incentives to
migrate which were summarize in equation (5) may be operating in diﬀerent parts of the health
distribution. The positive eﬀect of being healthy on migration may be indicative of good health
reducing migration costs. The positive eﬀect of being unhealthy on migration suggests that,
in this part of the health distribution, illness increases the beneﬁts to migration. For example,
older people who are exceptionally ill may migrate to be closer to family members who can care
for them. Moreover, we might expect this eﬀect to especially large among a population of older
people, many of whom are widowed and so may lack an adequate support network to care for
them in old age.
One crude way of testing this hypothesis is to see if being married attenuates the impact
of poor health on migration. The rationale behind this is that married individuals who are
in poor health can be taken care of by their spouses and would, thus, have lower incentives to
relocate to a state where they can be cared for by another family member. To test this “family
support network” hypothesis, we replicate the regressions from columns 3 and 6 of Table 4 except
that now we interact the unhealthy indicator with the marriage indicator. If this hypothesis is
true, then we would expect the interaction between bad health and the marriage indicator to be
11negative. The results are reported in Table 5. We see that the interaction term is negative and
signiﬁcant for men, but is negative and insigniﬁcant for women. We conclude that the evidence
f o rt h i sh y p o t h e s i si sm i x e d .
6 Potential Sources of Bias
In this section, we explore some factors that may bias our estimates. The next sub-section
investigates the role of reporting bias in SRHS. After that, we look into the role of non-random
attrition from the panel.
6.1 Systematic Reporting Bias in SRHS
While it true that SRHS has proven to be reliable measure of health, it is still subject to biases
and errors which, in some contexts, have been shown to be systematically correlated with socio-
economic variables. If similar errors exist in our data that are systematically correlated with
migrant status then our results will be biased. For example, if movers are systematically more
optimistic about their health than stayers then this would result in estimates that look as if
illness raises the costs of migration when, in fact, there may be no actual relationship between
health (in the objective sense) and migration.
To investigate this issue, we employ the PSID’s mortality ﬁle and estimate the relationship
between SRHS and mortality using Cox-Proportional Hazard Models while adjusting for age.9
9The PSID’s mortality ﬁle is considered sensitive and, thus, not publicly available. The death ﬁle contains
mortality information on all individuals in the PSID from 1968 to 2003 who were known to have died prior to 2004.
Mortality information ﬁrst comes from interviews with PSID families. PSID then corroborates this information
with the National Death Index. Death dates are recorded to the nearest month.
12To see if there were any systematic biases across movers and stayers, we split the sample by
migration status. One sample contained people who never moved while they were in our sample,
and the other contained people who moved at least once. We then estimated the hazard models
on both sample broken down by gender and age. Results are reported in Table 5.10
We take three points away from these results. First, we observe a statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between SRHS and mortality for both movers and stayers in all speciﬁcations except
for women under 60 years old. However, it is important to mention that we do see a statistically
signiﬁcant relationship for the sample of all women. Second, the samples of movers can be
quite small and, thus, the 95% conﬁdence intervals for the hazard ratios in these samples are
wide. Accordingly, the conﬁdence intervals on the SRHS hazard ratios always overlap for movers
and stayers. Third, while the hazard ratios for movers and stayers do diﬀer somewhat, it is
never systematic. In other words, there is no evidence of a systematically weaker (or stronger)
relationship between SRHS and mortality among movers than stayers. Overall, we take this
as evidence that there are probably not any systematic biases in our SRHS measures that are
impacting our ﬁndings.
6.2 Non-Random Attrition
A potentially more important source of bias is non-random attrition. The reason is that two of
the most common reasons for attrition are migration and death, the latter being more common
for unhealthy people.11 Unfortunately, non-random attrition is one of the least understood
10We used the 1984 wave of the PSID for the estimates. Each cell reports the hazard ratio for the relevant
variable and its 95% conﬁdence interval. If the hazard ratio is above (below) unity then that variable has a
positive (negative) eﬀect on mortality.
11Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1998) exhaustively examine the reasons for attrition from the PSID.
The reason for attrition of approximately 60% of all responders is not known. Of the remainder, approximately
13areas in econometrics and, thus, there are few solutions proposed in the literature to address it.
Moreover, some solutions which have been proposed are valid only under restrictive assumptions
which are almost certainly violated in our data.12 Consequently, due to a lack of valid solutions
to this diﬃcult problem, our approach is to provide a heuristic discussion of the bias that will
result from non-random attrition and argue that our estimates constitute a lower bound of the
true eﬀect of health on migration. We also hold that non-random attrition can help to make
sense of the observed non-monotonicty in Table 3.
With some abuse of notation, we consider a linear version of equation (6):
mi,t = gi,t−1γ + bi,t−1β + X
0
i,tθ + εi,t. (8)
Working with this linear model greatly facilitates the exposition. It should be noted that the
OLS estimates of equation (8) are very similar to the marginal eﬀects of Probit estimation of
equation (6).13 Equation (8) corresponds to the underlying population regression equation.
Due to non-random attrition, our data do not constitute an i.i.d. sample from this popu-
lation. Instead, we only observe observations for individuals who “survive,” or do not attrite,
across survey years. We let si,t denote the survival indicator. If the individual has survived
from time 0 to time t, then the indicator equals unity; otherwise, it is zero. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that attrition is an absorbing state. As a consequence of panel attrition,
the econometrician does not observe the vector (mi,t,g i,t−1,b i,t−1,X0
i,t). Instead, she observes
two-thirds attrite due to mortality and one-third attrite due to a move which could not be followed.
12One common procdure is Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) of Moﬃtt, Fitzgerald and Gottschalk (1999),
which is valid when attrition is aﬀected by observable characteristics from the ﬁrst year of the panel, but is
unaﬀected by anything that occurs subsequently. Clearly, this criterion is not met in our case since mortality
and migration are two of the primary causes of attrition in our data.
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However, OLS will result in inconsistent parameter estimates if the attrition is systematic since
this implies that the residual in equation (3) will be correlated with the right-hand side regressors,
particularly the health variables.14 This, in turn, implies that the orthogonality conditions which
are required for identiﬁcation will be violated and, thus, OLS will not recover the parameters in
equations (8) or (9).
The direction of the bias of the OLS estimates of γ and β will depend on the signs of two
expectations: E[si,tgi,t−1εi,t] and E[si,tbi,t−1εi,t]. W ea r g u et h a tt h ef o r m e ri sn e g a t i v ea n dt h e
latter is positive. The reason is that survival in the panel is positively (negatively) correlated
with being healthy (unhealthy) and negatively correlated with migration. Accordingly, we expect
that the OLS estimate of γ to be biased downwards and the estimate of β to be biased upwards.
In Table 6, we give the reader a sense of how attrition rates in our PSID sample vary by
health status. Each cell of the table reports the percentage of a PSID wave that attrites across
survey years. We break the calculations down by gender, health status and age. Two points
should be taken away from the table. First, attrition rates are substantially higher in the bottom
two SRHS categories than they are when calculated for the entire health distribution. Second,
attrition rates are substantially larger among people who are 60 years of age or older.
14If the attrition is not systematic or is random then E[gi,t−1εi,t|si,t =1 ]=0and, thus, by the law of iterated
expectations, we will also have that E[si,tgi,t−1εi,t]=0 . A similar argument can be applied to E[si,tbi,t−1εi,t].
15This has several implications for our ﬁndings. First, it implies that the estimates of the
eﬀects of health on migration from Table 2 are conservative. In other words, the true impact
of health on migration is probably greater than what we have estimated. Second, it suggests
that if the attrition bias is great enough, the OLS estimate of β may actually be positive even
if the true parameter is negative. Consequently, non-random attrition may also be responsible
for the observed non-monotonicity for older men from Table 4, especially since we would expect
the biases from attrition to be higher among older people for whom mortality-induced attrition
is higher.
7 Conclusions, Limitations and Broader Implications
In this paper, we test the proposition that the health of migrants does not constitute a random
sample of health in the sending region. Our results indicate that among men and women younger
than age 60, being healthy (unhealthy) increases (decreases) geographic mobility. Among men
older than age 60, the results appear to suggest that there is higher mobility at both the top and
bottom of the health distribution. For older women, there is no evidence that health impacts
mobility. We argue that, due to the bias induced by non-random attrition, the eﬀects of health
on migration constitute a lower bound. In other words, good (bad) health increases (decreases)
mobility by more than we estimate.
The primary limitation of this work is that it is not clear how much one can extrapolate our
results to other forms of migration such as international migration. Accordingly, our work does
not (at least directly) suggest that the better health outcomes that we observe among many
international immigrant groups are a consequence of positive selection on health. Nevertheless,
16we claim that our results are suggestive that positive selection may be an important part of
this puzzle. The paucity of evidence on positive selection on health in international migration
presumably has much to do with a lack of adequate data sources from the sending country. This
suggests an important avenue for future research.
A second avenue for future research is to better understand the relationship between positive
migrant selection on both health and labor market outcomes. One would expect these two
types of selection to be intimately related, as t h e r ei sal a r g el i t e r a t u r ew h i c hh a ss h o w nt h a t
poor health has large causal eﬀects on labor supply (Smith 1999; Rust and Phelan 1997) and
educational attainment (Miguel and Kremer 2004; Bobonis, Miguel and Puri-Sharma 2006; Case,
Fertig and Paxson 2004). Accordingly, an interesting (and ambitious) topic for future research
would be to investigate how much of the observed positive selection on labor market outcomes
is the result of the impact of health on labor supply and educational attainment.
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Moved Indicator of whether or not individual has
moved across two survey years
0.03
(0.17)
Self Reported Health Status
(SRHS)
1=excellent; 2 = very good; 3 = good
2=fair; 1 = poor
2.49
(1.15)
Healthy SRHS = 1 or 2 0.53
(0.50)
Unhealthy SRHS = 4 or 5 0.19
(0.39)
Age Individual’s Age 42.49
(15.91)




Sex =1 if female 0.54
(0.50)








White = 1 if the individual is white 0.66
(0.48)
Black = 1 if the individual is black 0.29
(0.46)
Married = 1 if the individual is married 0.71
(0.45)
22Table 2: Lagged Period Health - Under Age 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Men Women























































































R ˆ2 0.0361 0.0362 0.0863 0.0352 0.0358 0.0731
NT
4 39679 39677 39363 45291 45289 44906
+This table reports marginal eﬀects of Probit models where the dependent variable is moved. Standard
errors of the marginal eﬀect are in parentheses. Standard errors allow for clustering within individuals.
All regressions include a complete set of age dummies.
∗ Denotes 95% signiﬁcance.
∗∗Denotes 99% signiﬁcance.
1Refers to SRHS equal to 4 or 5.
2Refers to SRHS equals to 1 or 2.
3F− test of the null that the health variables are zero. p-values are in brackets.
4 NT refers to individual/time observations.
23Table 3: Lagged Period Health - Age 60 and Over
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Men Women























































































R ˆ2 0.0400 0.0408 0.1064 0.0255 0.0255 0.1069
NT
4 7591 7591 6299 10895 10895 10455
+This table reports marginal eﬀects of Probit models where the dependent variable is moved. Standard
errors of the marginal eﬀect are in parentheses. Standard errors allow for clustering within individuals.
All regressions include a complete set of age dummies.
∗ Denotes 95% signiﬁcance.
∗∗Denotes 99% signiﬁcance.
1Refers to SRHS equal to 4 or 5.
2Refers to SRHS equals to 1 or 2.
3F− test of the null that the health variables are zero. p-values are in brackets.
4 NT refers to individual/time observations.
24Table 4: The Impact of Marriage on Selective Migration
(1) (2)
Men Women


























R ˆ2 0.1137 0.1086
NT6 6299 10455
+This table reports marginal eﬀects of Probit models where the dependent variable is
moved. Standard errors of the marginal eﬀects are in parentheses. Standard errors
allow for clustering within individuals. All regressions contain the same set of controls
as are in columns 3 and 6 of Tables 2 and 3.
∗Denotes 95% signiﬁcance.
∗Denotes 99% signiﬁcance.
1Refers to SRHS equal to 4 or 5.
2Refers to SRHS equal to 1 or 2.
3p - values are in brackets.
4NT refers to individual/time observations.
25Table 5: SRHS and Mortality by Migration Status
< 60 Years
Men Women


























N 3329 601 4010 649
All Ages
Men Women


























N 3952 647 4904 731
+This table reports estimates of Cox proportional hazard models. The dependent variable is
mortality. Each cell reports the hazard ratio and its 95% conﬁdence interval. All estimates adjust
for clustering within individuals. If the hazard ratio is greater (less) than unity then the variable has a
positive (negative) eﬀect on mortality.
∗Denotes 95% signiﬁcance.
∗∗Denotes 99% signiﬁcance.
1Refers to SRHS equal to 4 or 5.
2Refers to SRHS equal to 1 or 2.
Table 6: Panel Attrition Rates by Age, Gender and Health Status
< 60 Years
Men Women
A l lS R H S = 4 o r 5A l lS R H S = 4 o r 5
4.32% 5.87% 4.19% 6.03%
>=6 0Y e a r s
Men Women
A l lS R H S = 4 o r 5A l lS R H S = 4 o r 5
5.17% 7.35% 5.10% 7.68%
26